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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DeWITT DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BOND FURNITURE, INC., dba
VRONTIKIS FURNITURE, NICK
VRONTIKIS and H E L E N W.
VRONTIKIS, his wife, ST.
NICHOLIS INVESTMENT
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
13625

B R I E F OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF T H E CASE
This was an action instituted by Plaintiff to collect
a promissory note, secured by a trust deed on real property and a lien on personal property, in which the District Court awarded Plaintiff its costs and attorneys
fees.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The question of the amount of costs and attorneys'
fees to be awarded Plaintiff was heard by the District
Court on January 25, 1974, and the Court awarded
Plaintiff the sum of $1,834.30.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the award of
the District Court affirmed on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 8, 1972, Plaintiff instituted action
against Defendants to recover the sum of $21,566.08,
plus interest, costs and attorneys fees, evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a trust deed on real
property and a lien on merchandise of the Defendants.
(R. 42-57). Through numerous procedures during the
following months, the Plaintiff's attorneys were able
to collect the entire principal and interest which was
due to the Plaintiff. These procedures included the
obtaining of a temporary restraining order and order
to show cause (R. 29-30); an agreement for disposal
of the merchandise which was the subject restraining
order and order to show cause (R. 34-39); an assignment of the proceeds of a real estate contract (R. 4041); the obtaining of a trust deed covering additional
real property (R. 26-28); the obtaining af assignments
of insurance proceeds (Exhibits 3-P and 4 - P ) ; and a
sales agreement (Exhibit 5-P). By March 20, 1973,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the only matter remaining to be resolved was the amount
of costs and attorneys' fees to be awarded Plaintiff in
the action. The sum of $1,834.30 was then deposited
with the Clerk of the Court to secure the payment of
these costs and attorneys' fees (R. 23-24). The Defendants never filed an answer or responsive pleading
to Plaintiff's complaint or to any other pleading or
motion of Plaintiff in the action, and on June 20, 1973,
the default of each of the Defendants was entered.
(R. 21)
On January 15, 1974, Plaintiff filed a motion to
have the Court set the amount of costs and attorneys'
fees to be awarded Plaintiff in the action (R. 12).
Notice of this motion was given to Defendants' attorneys (R. 14). On January 25, 1974, Plaintiff's motion
came on regularly for hearing before Judge Maurice
Harding. The Plaintiff's attorney, Roger J . McDonough, was placed under oath and testified as to the
nature and amount of work involved in the action and
what he considered to be a reasonable attorneys' fee to
be awarded in the action. H e was then cross examined
by Defendant's attorney, Paul Cotro-Manes. On the
basis of the evidence so introduced the Court awarded
Plaintiff the sum of $1,834.30 as its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees in the action (R. 8)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E ATTORNEYS' F E E S IN

THIS
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ACTION W E R E P R O P E R L Y AWARDE D BASED UPON SWORN T E S T I M O N Y AS TO T H E A M O U N T O F A
R E A S O N A B L E F E E TO B E A W A R D ED IN T H E ACTION.
The brief of Defendant-Appellants spends considerable time arguing that it is generally required that
evidence be introduced on the question of attorneys'
fees. Plaintiff-Respondent agrees entirely with the
position of Defendant-Appellants in this regard, and
agrees with the cases cited in support of this proposition.
I t appears clear that in the State of Utah, in the absence
of a stipulation, evidence should generally be introduced
on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded. This is
exactly what happened in the instant case.
On January 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a motion
to have the Court fix amount of costs and attorneys'
fees to be awarded in the action. (R. 12) This was the
only matter remaining to be resolved in the case. The
motion came on regularly for hearing on January 25,
1974, the Plaintiff being represented by Roger J. MeDonough and the Defendants being represented by Paul
Cotro-Manes. (R. 8). Plaintiff's attorney was placed
under oath and testified as to the nature and extent of
the work involved in the action and gave his opinion as
to the amount of costs and attorneys' fees which should
be awarded. H e was then cross examined by the Defendant's attorney, Paul Cotro-Manes. Following this
testimony and cross examination the matter was subDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitted and the Court awarded Plaintiff the sum of
$1,834.30.
Nowhere in Defendant-Appellant's brief is it asserted that Plaintiff's attorney was not sworn, did not
testify under oath on the matter of attorneys' fees or
was not subjected to cross examination. The DefendantAppellants admit at page 2 of their brief that Plaintiff's
attorney did testify as to the legal services performed
in the matter. This evidence so introduced, complied
fully with the directive of the Supreme Court as to the
procedure to be followed in awarding attorneys' fees.
The Defendant-Appellants appear to assert, however, that six documents which were exhibited to the
Court during the testimony of Plaintiff's attorney were
not formally introduced in evidence, and that therefore
no evidence was introduced.
The specious nature of this argument deserves
little comment. The testimony of Plaintiff's attorney
was introduced in evidence. This is the only type of
evidence that is required. There never has been a doctrine in this state that the amount of an award for attorneys' fees must be established by documentary evidence as opposed to sworn testimony. In fact, it is sworn
testimony, and not documentary evidence, that is employed in almost every case to establish the amount
of an award for attorneys' fees.
The six documents in question which were exhibited
to the Court during the course of the testimony were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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merely demonstrative of the work performed by Plaintiff's attorney which was not shown by the record already
on file in the action. The unchallenged pleadings themselves were replete with other evidence of the work performed by Plaintiff's attorneys in the case. Illustrative
of this work were the temporary restraining order and
order to show cause (R. 29-30) ; the agreement for
disposal of the merchandise (R. 34-39); the obtaining
of the assignment of the proceeds of the real estate contract (R. 40-41); and the obtaining of a trust deed
covering additional real property (R. 26-28).
The procedure which was adopted in this case in
establishing the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded
is the procedure outlined in the concurring opinion of
Justice Ellett in the recent case of Hatch v. Sugarhouse
Finance Company, 20 U.2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 (1967).
Plaintiff's attorney was sworn, testified as to the nature
and extent of the work performed in the action, and
was cross examined by Defendants attorney. The matter was then submitted to the Court and the Court executed an order stating that evidence was introduced
and that Plaintiff was to be awarded the sum of
$1,834.30 for its costs and reasonable attorneys fees
in the action.
POINT II
T H E F A C T T H A T NO S T E N O G R A P H I C R E P O R T OF T H E PROCEEDI N G W A S M A D E OR I S A V A I L A B L E
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DOES NOT E N T I T L E D E F E N D A N T A P P E L L A N T S TO A R E V E R S A L O F
T H E A W A R D WHERE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS HAVE MADE
NO A T T E M P T TO C O M P L Y W I T H
R U L E 75 (m) U T A H R U L E S O F C I V I L
PROCEDURE.
The Defendant-Appellants do not claim that the
testimony taken in this matter was insufficient to sustain the award of attorneys' fees in this case. They do
not point out one scintilla of testimony or evidence in
support of the proposition that some lesser or different
award should have been made or that the award which
was made was excessive, or was an abuse of the Trial
Court's discretion. What the Defendant-Appellants do
claim is that no stenographic report of the testimony
was taken or is available. They claim, therefore, that
it must be presumed that the testimony did not support
the award, that the award is excessive, or that the trial
court abused its discretion, and the award of costs and
attorneys' fees must be reversed. I t is respectfully submitted that this is not the law.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
contemplate that situations may arise in which no stenographic report of proceedings was made, or is available.
In such situations the case is not simply reversed or
remanded at the request of the appellant. Such cases
are governed by Rule 75 (m), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(m) Appeals When No Stenographic
Report Available. In the event no stenographic report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or is available, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available
means, including his recollection, for use instead of a stenographic transcript. This statement shall be served on the respondent who
may serve objections or propose amendments
thereto within 10 days after service upon him.
Thereupon the statement, with the objections
or proposed amendments, shall be submitted to
the district court for settlement and approval
and as settled and approved shall be included
by the clerk of the court in the record on appeal."
The right to prepare such a statement of the evidence and proceedings pursuant to Rule 75 (m) is
granted to the appellant. There is no similar rule granting such a right to a respondent, the respondent's sole
right being to object to the appellant's statement and
propose amendments thereto.
In the instant case, if Defendant-Appellants
thought that there was anything at all in testimony
which indicated that the award in question was excessive or that the trial court abused its discretion, the attorney for Defendant-Appellants could have prepared
a statement of such testimony, based on his own recollection, and have thereby afforded the Supreme Court the
opportunity to determine whether or not the testimony
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was sufficient to sustain the award. This, of course, the
Defendant-Appellants have failed to do.
Rule 75 (m) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is identical to Rule 10(c), Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure (formerly Rules 75 (n) Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.) This Federal Rule was construed in
the case of Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1963) in a situation quite similar to the one involved in the instant case.
In the Murphy case a portion of the reporter's recording discs were destroyed, and consequently, portions
of proceedings in the trial court were not available as a
part of the record on appeal. In the Murphy case as in
the instant case, the appellant contended that the case
must be remanded for a new trial because of the unavailability of the transcript of that portion of the proceedings in which error was claimed to have occurred.
In the Murphy case, as in the instant case, the appellant
made no effort to supply the record through Rule 75(n). The appellate court refused to order a new trial
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court stated:
" . . . I t is elementary that the burden is on the
appellants to show error. CF. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Alexander, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d
385.
The appellants have not availed themselves of the provisions of Rule 75 (n), F.R.C.P., a procedure which might well have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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enabled them to bring a sufficient record before us. CF. Cadby v. Savoretti, 5 Cir. 1956,
242 F.2d 751 and Herring v. Kennedy-Herring Hardware Co., 6 Cir., 1958 261 F.2d
202. I n the absence of compliance with the
Rules, the charges urged to be erroneous are
not in the record and not before us. Browder
v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 292 F.2d 44,
49."
Where evidence or proceedings in the lower court
were not transcribed, or where the stenographic transcript is not available, the appellant cannot obtain a
reversal unless he at least makes an attempt to comply
with Rule 75 (m). The following excerpts from 9 Moore,
Federal Practice §210.66 at pages 1629-1631 set forth
the law in this regard:
"The stated purpose of original Civil
Rule 75(n), analogue of present Rule 10(c),
was to provide 'a method whereby a record may
be prepared in the perhaps rare case where
there is no reporter present at all and no stenographic report is made of the proceedings.'
# # #

'If it is necessary to add to the record
parts of the evidence or proceedings which
were not recorded by the reporter, the provisions of Rule 10(c) must be followed. Bare
recitals of counsel as to what transpired are
not enough.' "
* * *

"Since Rule 10(c) does provide a method
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of including in the record proceedings and
evidence that do not appear in the reporter's
transcript, a party may not seek a new trial
simply on the ground that matters that occurred in the district court are not reflected in
the transcript. H e must at least make an
effort to supplement the record by proceeding
under Rule 10(c)."
In the instant case no stenographic transcript of
the testimony in question was apparently made or is
available. This does not entitle appellant to a reversal
or a new trial where he has made no attempt whatsoever
to provide such testimony, through his attorney's best
recollection, pursuant to Rule 75 (m). If DefendantAppellants in fact believe that the testimony was insufficient to sustain the award, they should supply such
testimony as they feel will sustain their position as provided by Rule 75 (m). The Defendant-Appellants have
the burden of establishing that the testimony taken did
not support the award. They have failed completely to
sustain this burden through their failure to point out
to this Court through the use of Rule 75 (m), in what
respects the testimony was deficient.
POINT III
F I N D I N G S O F F A C T A N D CONCLUSIONS OF L A W W E R E NOT REQ U I R E D I N T H E I N S T A N T CASE.
Defendant-Appellants' final contention is that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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award in the instant case must be reversed because no
findings of fact and conclusions of law were made in
the instant case. However, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the record in this case show that no findings
of fact and conclusions of law were required. Rule 52
(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of
law may be waived by the parties to an issue
of fact:
(1) By default or by failing to appear
at the trial; . . . " (Emphasis added)
Where the defendants have failed to answer or
otherwise plead to the Plaintiff's complaint, and their
default has been entered, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are required in order to sustain the judgment or award. Such defaulting Defendants are not
even entitled to notice of any further proceedings in the
action. (Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the instant case the Defendants were all served
with summons and verified complaints on December
8, 1972 (R. 15-20). None of the Defendants ever filed
any answer or other adverse pleading in the action and
on June 12, 1973, the default of all Defendants was
entered. (R. 21) No motion was ever made to have the
default of the Defendants set aside. Six months after
the Defendants' default was entered, the hearing was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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held to fix the amount of attorneys' fees in the action.
At that time the default of the Defendants continued,
and still continues up to the present time. Under these
circumstances, no findings of fact or conclusions of law
are required.
In the instant case the defendants waived findings
of fact and conclusions of law by their default in the
action. A party who thus waives the making of findings
of fact and conclusions of law cannot thereafter take
advantage of his default, and complain that no findings
of fact were made. In such circumstances the Supreme
Court will not review the facts but will assume that the
trial court found them to be such as to sustain his award.
Farrell v. Turner, 25 U.2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971);
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952).
CONCLUSION
I n the instant case the Defendants failed to answer
or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's verified complaint and
their default in the action was entered. By their failure
to answer, the Defendants admitted the allegations of
the complaint, including their execution of the note and
trust deed which provided for the payment of attorneys'
fees. By their default they also waived findings of fact
and conclusions of law and waived the right to receive
notice of any further proceedings in the case.
In spite of the fact that they had waived the right
to receive notice of a hearing to fix the amount of attorneys' fees, notice of the hearing was given to DeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendants by Plaintiff. At the hearing, the Plaintiff's
attorney was sworn and testified on the matter of attorneys' fees. H e was then cross examined by Defendants' attorney. At the conclusion of the hearing the
matter was submitted and the Court awarded Plaintiff
the sum of $1,834.30.
The fact that no stenographic report of the hearing
was made, or is available is not grounds for reversing
the decision of the trial court. If the Defendants actually
believe that the testimony given was insufficient to sustain the award, they have the burden of establishing
such insufficiency. Rule 75 (m) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that in such circumstances,
the Appellants must prepare a statement of the evidence
and proceedings in lieu of the stenographic transcript.
Such a statement supporting the alleged claim of insufficiency would have been a simple document to prepare. I t could have been based solely on the recollection
of Appellants' attorney as to what took place at the
hearing. The Appellants never attempted to prepare
such a statement.
The actions of the Defendant-Appellants in this
case has been one of continuous default. They defaulted
in making their payment of the promissory note and
this necessitated the institution of the action. They defaulted in answering or otherwise pleading to the verified complaint, thereby admitting the allegations of the
complaint, and waiving findings of fact and conclusions
of law and notice of any further proceedings in the case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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They defaulted in preparing the statement of evidence
and proceedings required by Rule 75 (m) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, thereby failing to sustain their burden of establishing that the testimony given at the hearing was insufficient to support the award. The Defendant-Appellants should not be permitted to harvest a
benefit sown from the seeds of their own numerous
defaults.
I t is respectfully submitted that in the instant case,
the Supreme Court must assume that the Trial Court
found the facts to be in accordance with its award, that
the testimony supported the award and that the decision
of the trial court must be affirmed.
Roger J. McDonough, of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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